Crime Beat

NEW YORK (WABC) -- A new report is calling into question the legality of the NYPD's Stop and Frisk policy.
The study by a Columbia University law professor makes the claim that the highly-touted crime fighting tool is based on race, not crime. It's a rather damning report that challenges the NYPD's claims that stopping and frisking hundreds of thousands of people every year is constitutional. The findings claim the practice is actually targeting blacks and Latinos and yields few results. To the NYPD, Its "Stop and Frisk" practice is one of its greatest crime fighting tools.
To many of those stopped, it seems like racial profiling. Now, a new report by a Columbia University Law Professor finds race may drive the policy. Professor Jeffrey Fagan analyzed 2.7 million stops made during a 6 year period and found police "often used race in lieu of reasonable suspicion" to make the stops. 7% of the time, data he says, shows police had no legal justification for the stops. 24% of the time, the stops lacked enough details to assess whether they were constitutional. "That's a huge problem and means hundreds of thousands of people are having their rights violated," said Darius Charney, of the Center for Constitutional Rights.

1,000s of NYC Stop-&-Frisks Unjustified, Law Prof Finds; City Argues He Was Paid $375/Hour to Say So
By Martha Neil — Wednesday, October 27th, 2010 ‘The ABA Journal’ / Chicago, IL 
Tens of thousands of New Yorkers have been stopped and frisked without adequate, documented legal justification over the past six years, a Columbia University law professor says in a study conducted for an ongoing civil rights case. In a report written for the Center for Constitutional Rights, professor Jeffrey Fagan also cites racial profiling as a common problem underlying many of the unnecessary stops, reports the New York Times. 
However, the city's police commissioner, Raymond Kelly, contends that the racial characteristics of those stopped correlates with the racial characteristics of suspects. He also says the professor was paid to come up with a study that put the New York Police Department, which is being sued by the Center for Constitutional Rights, in a bad light, the newspaper reports.

By AL BAKER and RAY RIVERA — Wednesday, October 27th, 2010 ‘The New York Times’
Tens of thousands of times over six years, the police stopped and questioned people on New York City streets without the legal justification for doing so, a new study says. And in hundreds of thousands of more cases, city officers failed to include essential details on required police forms to show whether the stops were justified, according to the study written by Prof. Jeffrey A. Fagan of Columbia Law School.

The study was conducted on behalf of the Center for Constitutional Rights, which is suing the New York Police Department for what the center says is a widespread pattern of unprovoked and unnecessary stops and racial profiling in the department’s stop-question-and-frisk policy. The department denies the charges.

My last post dealt with a U.S. Virgin Islands case in which a federal judge held that the seizure of a Blackberry violated the 4th Amendment. This post is about a New York case in which a state judge held that a Blackberry was seized lawfully . . . a holding I tend to disagree with, at least in part.

We’ll start, as usual, with the facts:

[O]n January 1, 2010, [Detective DeStefano] was notified by the Lynbrook Police Department that a pedestrian robbery had occurred at 7:30 p.m., at the intersection of Nieuman Avenue and Merrick Road, in Lynbrook. . .

Many a “sick” employee, job seeker or college applicant has discovered that what happens on Facebook or Twitter often doesn’t stay on Facebook or Twitter.  Now parties to lawsuits are finding the same thing. A Suffolk County, New York trial judge recently ruled that the private areas of a plaintiff’s Facebook and  MySpace profiles could be discovered by the defendants in her personal injury suit to prove she wasn’t injured as badly as she claimed. In Romano v. Steelcase , Kathleen Romano fell off a desk chair at the college where she was employed.  She sued the manufacturer and

distributor for making a defective product, claiming permanent neck and back  injuries that  largely confined her to home or bed, and reduced her quality of life.  Yet, the public pages of her Facebook and MySpace pages showed her happily traveling to Florida and Pennsylvania during times she  claimed she was incapacitated. The defendant then requested consent from Ms. Romano to access the private sections of her social networking sites to disprove the extent of her injuries. She refused, and the defendant filed a motion to show cause why this information should not be turned over.

Friday, 09 January 2009 07:00


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Bad karma: we can't find that page!

You asked for {%sh404SEF_404_URL%}, but despite our computers looking very hard, we could not find it. What happened ?

  • the link you clicked to arrive here has a typo in it
  • or somehow we removed that page, or gave it another name
  • or, quite unlikely for sure, maybe you typed it yourself and there was a little mistake ?

{sh404sefSimilarUrlsCommentStart}It's not the end of everything though : you may be interested in the following pages on our site:{sh404sefSimilarUrlsCommentEnd}


Sunday, 12 September 2010 14:17

Important Links

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Sunday, 12 September 2010 08:24

Welcome To Affordable Bails

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Welcome To Affordable Bails New York, Inc.


We are Affordable Bails New York, Inc. (AB)  with offices in and around New York. AB has the strongest capabilities to execute Bail Bonds and Transfer Bonds.  Our general agent is Surety Corporation of America and our underwriter is American Reliable Insurance Corporation.

Utilizing our capable and knowledgeable network of professionals our reach expands exponentially across almost all the United States including the Island 's of Puerto Rico and Hawaii . This helps families that are most in need of bailing a loved one out of jail in a state other than the one they live in.

Almost no other Bail Bonds entity offers this virtual reach nationally that our BailUSA network offers.

It is rare, if ever, that persons seeking to bail-out a loved one are able to tap into the resources of a company such as ours which has an offering of staff and owners that are real former New York City and Federal law enforcement professionals that work tirelessly to execute a bail for your loved one.

Call us Now at 1-888 932-2458

Simply, we at AB pride ourselves in being able to assist families in need of fast, courteous and honest bail bond service.

When you engage our services, a closely knit bail-team immediately spring into action assisting you to navigate the entire criminal justice process while quickly and efficiently bailing your loved one out of jail.  We even have a detailed network of professional attorney's, mostly former prosecutors, located in each county that can be referred to you upon request.

AB offers a totally Free bail consultation for you and your family. With AB you can be confident that we will always work hard to be there for you, your family and friends in the times you need us the most. Our offices are designed to privately and discreetly handle your personal bail transactions in a clean and comfortable office suite setting. Other so-called bail bonds company's offer a dirty 'check cashing place/bullet proof glass' appearance of the seedy conventional Bail Bondsman.

Simply, in time of crisis selecting the appropriate bail bondsman is a crucial decision that needs to be made in a quite office setting surrounded by level-headed and knowledgeable bail professionals. This support, knowledge and privacy are crucial if a friend or loved one is to be bailed out quickly.

By selecting Affordable Bails New York, Inc. you have made the appropriate decision insuring that a loved one gets the opportunity to be free of jail during criminal proceedings against him/her.   Many different choices and bail bondsmen exist, but only AB will help you in navigating the complicated criminal justice process successfully.

Let Affordable Set You FreeAffordable Bails New York, Inc. has designed this website in order to help you understand the bail process.  You should know that the rule of thumb for bail is around 10% of the bail is the bondsmen's commission. Collateral, which you get back at the end of the case, also needs to be posted. This can be a home, co-op, condominium, land and of course cash. In most cases judges want to see collateral cash equaling to 35-50% of the bail in most jurisdictions. In others jurisdictions a combination of cash and property is required equaling and or exceeding the amount of the bail. Remember that if the conditions of the bail are met and when the case is over collateral is returned to the depositor in its entirety.

Bail bond laws vary from state to state, but allowing Affordable Bail Bonds to help you understand the basic rules regarding posting a bail will help you make a more informed decision when time is a factor.

If you have any questions or comments please contact us toll free immediately at (888) 932-2458

Sunday, 12 September 2010 07:28

History Of Bail

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History Of Bail

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Bail laws in the United States grew out of a long history of English statutes and policies.   During the colonial period, Americans relied on the bail structure that had developed in England hundreds of years earlier.  When the colonists declared independence in 1776, they no longer relied on English law, but formulated their own policies which closely paralleled the English tradition.  The ties between the institution of bail in the United States is also based on the old English system.   In attempting to understand the meaning of the American constitutional bail provisions and how they were intended to supplement a larger statutory bail structure, knowledge of the English system and how it developed until the time of American independence is essential. 

In medieval England, methods to insure the accused would appear for trial began as early as criminal trials themselves.  Until the 13th century, however, the conditions under which a defendant could be detained before trial or released with guarantees that he would return were dictated by the local Sheriffs. x    As the regional representative of the crown, the sheriff possessed sovereign authority to release or hold suspects.  The sheriffs, in other words, could use any standard and weigh any factor in determining whether to admit a suspect to bail.  This broad authority was not always judiciously administered.  Some sheriffs exploited the bail system for their own gain.  Accordingly, the absence of limits on the power of the sheriffs was stated as a major grievance leading to the Statute of Westminster. xi 

The Statute of Westminster in 1275 eliminated the discretion of sheriffs with respect to which crimes would be bailable.  Under the Statute, the bailable and non-bailable offenses were specifically listed. xii  The sheriffs retained the authority to decide the amount of bail and to weigh all relevant factors to arrive at that amount.  The Statute, however, was far from a universal right to bail.  Not only were some offenses explicitly excluded from bail, but the statutes' restrictions were confined to the abuses of the sheriffs.  The justices of the realm were exempt from its provisions. 

Applicability of the statute to the judges was the key issue several centuries later when bail law underwent its next major change. In the early seventeenth century, King Charles I received no funds from the Parliament.   Therefore, he forced some noblemen to issue him loans.  Those who refused to lend the sovereign money were imprisoned without bail.  Five incarcerated knights filed a habeas corpus petition arguing that they could not be held indefinitely without trial or bail.  The King would neither bail the prisoners nor inform them of any charges against them.  The King's reasons for keeping the charges secret were evident: the charges were illegal; the knights had no obligation to lend to the King.  When the case was brought before the court, counsel for the knights argued that without a trial or conviction, the petitioners were being detained solely on the basis of an unsubstantiated and unstated accusation.  Attorney General Heath contended that the King could best balance the interests of individual liberty against the interests of state security when exercising his sovereign authority to imprison.  The court upheld this sovereign prerogative argument. xiii 

Parliament responded to the King's action and the court's ruling with the Petition of Right of 1628.  The Petition protested that contrary to the Magna Carta and other laws guaranteeing that no man be imprisoned without due process of law, the King had recently imprisoned people before trial "without any cause showed."  The Petition concluded that "no freeman, in any manner as before mentioned, be imprisoned or detained..."  The act guaranteed, therefore, that man could not be held before trial on the basis of an unspecific accusation.  This did not, however, provide an absolute right to bail.  The offenses enumerated in the Statute of Westminster remained bailable and non-bailable.  Therefore, an individual charged with a non-bailable offense could not contend that he had a legal entitlement to bail. 

The King, the courts and the sheriffs were able to frustrate the intent of the Petition of Right through procedural delays in granting the writs of habeas corpus.  In 1676, for example, when Francis Jenkes sought a  writ of habeas corpus concerning his imprisonment for the vague charge of "sedition," it was denied at first because the court was "outside term," and later because the case was not calendared; furthermore, when the court was requested to calendar the case it refused to do so.  In response to the rampant procedural delays in providing habeas corpus as evidenced by Jenkes Case, xv  Parliament passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1677.  The act strengthened the guarantee of habeas corpus by specifying that a magistrate: 

shall discharge the said Prisoner from his Imprisonment taking his or their Recognizance, with one or more Surety or Sureties, in any Sum according to their discretion, having regard to the Quality of the Prisoner and Nature of the offense, for his or their Appearance in the Court of the King's bench...unless it shall appear...that the Party (is)...committed...for such Matter or offenses for which by law the Prisoner is not Bailable. xvi  

By requiring early designation of the cause for arrest, the Habeas Corpus Act provided a suspect with knowledge that the alleged offense was either bailable or not.  The Statute of Westminster remained the primary definition of what offenses would be eligible for bail. 

Although the Habeas Corpus Act improved administration of bail laws, it provided no protection against excessive bail requirements.  Even if a suspect was accused of a bailable offense and therefore was entitled to some bail, he could still be detained if the financial condition of release was exorbitantly high.  As evidence of this abuse reached Parliament, it responded with the English bill of Rights of 1689.  In the Preamble, the bill accused the King of attempting "to subvert...the laws and liberties of the kingdom: in the "excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the Subjects." xvii     The Bill of Rights proposed to remedy the situation by declaring "that excessive bail ought not to be required." xviii  Thus, the precursor of the Eighth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution was drafted to prevent those accused of bailable offenses from unreasonable bail requirements.  It did not alter the categories of bailable crimes found in the separate Statute of Westminster and certainly did not guarantee a right to bail. 

The language of the English Bill of Rights was only one part of the bail system developed through many years of English law.  As Caleb Foote has explained and this analysis recounts, English protection against unjustifiable detention contained three essential elements: first, offenses were categorized as bailable or not bailable by statutes beginning with Westminster I which also placed limits on which judges and officials could effect the statue; second, habeas corpus procedures were developed as an effective curb on imprisonment without specific changes; and third, the excessive bail clause of the 1689 Bill of Rights protected against judicial officers who might abuse bail policy by setting excessive financial conditions for release.  English law never contained an absolute right to bail.  Bail could always be denied when the legislature determined certain offenses were unbailable.  Most of the history of bail law after Westminster I was an attempt to improve the efficiency of existing law and especially to grant the suspect a meaningful chance to satisfy bail conditions when he had committed those offenses that the legislature had declared bailable. 

In colonial America, bail law was patterned after the English law.  While some colonies initiated their own laws which were very similar to English statutes, others simply guaranteed their subjects the same protections guaranteed to British citizens.  When the colonies became independent in 1776, however, they could no longer simply insure the protections of English law.  Accordingly, the colonies enacted specific bail laws.  Typical of the early American bail laws were those enacted in Virginia perpetuating the bail system as it had evolved in England.   Section 9 of Virginia's Constitution in 1776 declared simply that "excessive bail ought not to be required…" xix   This constitutional provision was supplemented in 1785 with a statute which eliminated judges; discretion to grant bail by specifying that: those shall be let to bail who are apprehended for any crime not punishable in life or limb...But if a crime be punishable by life or limb, or if it be manslaughter and there be good cause to believe the party guilty thereof, he shall not be admitted to bail." xx  Thus the Virginia laws closely paralleled the English system.  Statutes defined which offenses were bailable while the Constitution protected against abuses of those definitions.  In fact, the clause in the Virginia Constitution was identical to the one in the English Bill of Rights which had been included to prevent judges from unreasonable holding those accused of bailable offenses by setting bail so high as to be unobtainable.  Other State constitutions similarly proscribed excessive bail for bailable offenses in order to prevent this method of thwarting the bail laws passed by the legislatures: for example, section 29 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 provided that "Excessive bail shall not be exacted for bailable offenses." xxi  

With James Madison designated to prepare an initial draft for Bill of Rights n 1789, the Virginia constitution, often referred to as the Virginia Bill of Rights, became the model for the first ten amendments that passed congress in 1789 and were ratified in 1791.  The Eighth Amendment in this Bill of Rights was taken virtually verbatim from Section 9 of the Virginia Constitution and provided that "Excessive bail shall not be required..."   The only comment on the clause during the congressional debates was made by the perplexed Mr. Livermore:   "The clause seems to have no meaning to it, I do not think it necessary.   What is meant by the term excessive Bail…!" xxii 

Indeed, it seems the drafters thought relatively little about the meaning of the bail clause; the clause was so rooted in American and English history that to most, the meaning was obvious.  Like the identical clause in the English Bill of Rights and the Virginia Constitution, the Eighth Amendment bail provision was intended to prohibit excessive bail as a means of holding suspects accused of offenses deemed bailable by Congress. 

The bail clause in the Eighth Amendment was only one part of the American bail structure. xxiii  As in England, the American system also includes guarantees against imprisonment without informing the suspect of his crime.   The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, like the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1678, insures that when arrested, a man "be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation" thereby enabling him to demand bail if he has committed a bailable offense.  The final part of the American bail structure and the element upon which the Constitution provisions are based is the statutory codification of justice officials' power concerning bail and the categorization of crimes into bailable and nonbailable offenses.  The Constitution merely guarantees that excessive bail may not be employed to hold suspects who by law are entitled to bail; similarly the Sixth Amendment enables prisoners to know if they are in fact entitled to bail under the law; it does not give them any right to bail already existing in the law.  Thus, the legislature and not the constitution is the real framer of bail law; the constitution upholds and protects against abuse of the system which the legislature creates.  This principle was well understood by the Framers of the Bill of rights.  In fact, the same Congress that proposed the Eighth Amendment also formulated the fundamental bail statute that remained in force until 1966.  This was accomplished in 1789, the same year that the Bill of rights was introduced, when Congress passed the Judiciary Act.  The Act specified which types of crime were bailable and set bounds on the judges' discretion in setting bail.   Following the tradition of State laws developed during the colonial period which in turn were based on English law, xxiv the Judiciary Act stated that all noncapital offenses were bailable and that in capital offenses, the decision to detain a suspect before trial was left up to the judge: 

{U}pon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except where punishment may be by death, in which cases it shall not be admitted but by the supreme or a circuit court, or by a justice of the supreme court, or a judge of a district court, who shall exercise their discretion therein, regarding the nature and circumstance of the offense, and of the evidence, the usages of law. xxv 

The sequence of events in the First Congress pertaining to American bail policy is critical to an understanding of the Framers of the Eighth Amendment and the Judiciary Act of 1789.   Only a few days after final passage of the Bill of Rights in Congress on September 21, 1789, and before its final adoption, the First Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 on September 29, 1789.  In fact, these two legislative measures were debated almost concurrently.  Considerable debate time was consumed in the House of Representatives over the issue of which should be enacted first, the bill creating a federal judiciary and federal judicial procedures or the amendments to the Constitution.   Eventually Madison's point of view that the Bill of Rights should take precedence so that "the independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves...the guardians of those rights" xxvi prevailed.  But the same day the House completed the Bill of Rights it proceeded to perfect the Judiciary Act of 1789 which was already approved by the Senate.  The two legislative proposals passed each other going and coming between the House and the Senate.  This historical footnote illuminated significantly the context in which these measures were debated.  They were almost considered simultaneously.  Often representatives argued that changes in one measure were unnecessary because the other provided ample protection for vital rights. xxviii 

This context suggests strongly that the First Congress acted very purposefully in substantially adopting the English system of tripartite protection against bail abuses.  The Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive bail meant that bail may not be excessive in those cases where Congress has deemed it proper to permit bail.  The Congress then enacted the Judiciary Act defining what offenses would be bailable.  Habeas corpus protection was afforded by Article I of the Constitution. 

The argument that the excessive bail clause guarantees a right to bail by necessary implication and that the provision forbidding excessive bail would be meaningless if judges could deny bail altogether in some cases is clearly not valid in this historical context.  The same Congress which drafted the Eighth Amendment enacted the Judiciary Act which specifically denied a right to bail to individuals charged with capital offense. 

In the context of its legislative history, the Eighth Amendment is illuminated by reading it in conjunction with the Judiciary Act of 1789.   The First Congress adopted the Amendment to prevent judges from setting excessive bail in cases prescribed as bailable by Congress.  The same legislators then enacted a bill prescribing which offenses would be bailable.  The Eighth Amendment, therefore, is not self-executing.  It requires legislation creating legal entitlements to bail to give it effect.  Recognizing this, the First Congress provided almost simultaneously the legislation that gave the Amendment effect.  The First Congress did not choose a strange legal arrangement; it chose precisely the system most familiar to these former English citizens.  The First Congress recognized that the Amendment was not intended to limit congressional discretion to determine the cases for which bail would be allowed, but was designed to circumscribe the authority of courts to ignore or circumvent that congressional policy with excessive bail requirements. 

The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not differentiate between bail before and after conviction.  Not until 1946 in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was this distinction clearly made.  Rule 46 made the 1789 Act's language the standard for release, but left release after conviction pending an appeal or application for certiorari to the judge's discretion regardless of the crime. 

In 1966 Congress enacted the first major substantive change in federal bail law since 1789.  The Bail Reform Act of 1966 provides that a non-capital defendant " ordered released pending trial on his personal recognizance" or on personal bond unless the judicial officer determines that these incentives will not adequately assure his appearance at trial. xxviii   In that case, the judge must select the least restrictive alternative from a list of conditions designed to guarantee appearance.  That list includes restrictions on travel, execution of an appearance bond (refundable when the defendant appears), and execution of a bail bond with a sufficient number of solvent sureties.  Individuals charged with a capital offense or who have been convicted and are awaiting sentencing or appeal are subject to a different standard.  They are to be released unless the judicial officer has "reason to believe" that no conditions "will reasonably assure that the person will not flee or pose danger to any other person or to the community."  

The 1966 Act thus created a presumption for releasing a suspect with as little burden as necessary in order to insure his appearance at trial.   Appearance of the defendant for trial is the sole standard for weighing bail decision.  In noncapital cases, the Act does not permit a judge to consider a suspect's dangerousness to the community.  Only in capital cases or after conviction is the judge authorized to weigh threats to community safety. 

This aspect of the 1966 Act drew criticism particularly in the District of Columbia where all crimes formerly fell under the regulation of Federal bail law.  In a considerable number of instances, persons accused of violent crimes committed additional crimes while released on their own personal recognizance.   Furthermore, these individuals were often released again on nominal bail. 

The problems associated with the 1966 Bail Reform Act were considered by the Judicial Council committee to study the Operation of the Bail Reform Act in the Distract of Columbia in May 1969.  The committee was particularly bothered by the release of potentially dangerous noncapital suspects permitted by the 1966 law and recommended that even in noncapital cases, a person's dangerousness be considered in determining conditions for release.  Congress went along with the ideas put forth in the committee's proposals and changed the 1966 Bail Reform Act as it applied to persons charged with crimes in the District of Columbia.  The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 allowed judges to consider dangerousness to the community as well as risk of flight when setting bail in noncapital cases.  The 1970 Act contained numerous safeguards against irrational application of the dangerousness provisions.  For instance, an individual could not be detained before trial under the act unless the court finds that (1) there is clear and convincing evidence that he falls into one of the categories subject to detention under the act, (2) no other pretrial release conditions will reasonably assure community safety, and (3) there is substantial probability that the suspect committed the crime for which he has been arrested.   This last finding was an overzealous exercise of legislative precaution.  The Justice Department testified that the burden of meeting this "substantial probability" requirement was the principal reason cited by prosecutors for the failure over the last 10 years to request pretrial detention hearings under the statute.   Such a standard also had the effect of making the pretrial detention hearing a vehicle for pretrial discovery of the Government's case and harassment of witnesses.   Moreover, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in its Edwards xxix decision strongly suggests that the probable cause standard consistently sustained by the Supreme Court as a basis for imposing "significant restraints on liberty" would be constitutionally sufficient in the context of pretrial detention. 

xii Edw. 1. C. 15 In additional to capital offenses, the list included "Thieves openly defamed and known" those "taken for House-burning feloniously done," or those taken for counterfeiting and many other non-capital offenses.
xiii "Five Knights Case" or "Proceedings on the Habeas Corpus" brought by Sir Thomas Darnel. 3 St. Fr. 1 (1627).
xiv William Duker, "The Right to Bail: An Historical Inquiry" 64, 42, Albany L. Rev. 33 (1977).
xvi 81 Car. 2 c. 2.
xvii W. & M. st 2 c. 2 preamble clause 10.
xviii 1 W. & M. st. 2 c. 2. Rights clause 10.
xix 7 American Charters 3813 (F. Thorpe ed.. 1909)
xx 12 Va. Stat. 185-86 (W. Hening ed.. 1823)
xxi 7 American Charters 3813 (F. Thorpe ed..1909)
xxii 1 "Annals of Congress" 754 (1789).
xxiii Caleb Foote, "The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail." 113 Pennsylvania L. Rev. 959. At 968 (1965). Hermine Herta Meyer, "The Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention,: 60 Georgetown L. Rev. 1139 (1972).
xxiv Duker. Supra note 14 at 77-83
xxv The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 91.
xxvi 1 "Annals of Congress" 428, 462 (1789)
xxvii Id. At 448.
xviii the Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. 3146 et seq.
xxix United States v. Edwards, No. 80-294 (D.C. App. May 8, 1981) (slip opinion). Petition….

Sunday, 12 September 2010 07:23

Why Affordable Bails?

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Why Affordable Bails?

At Affordable Bails New York, Inc. we are family owned and operate across all of New York City and Long Island 24 hrs / 7 Days a week.  We are the only Bail Bondsmen in the State of NY that has our unique combination of real former New York City and New York State law enforcement professionals that goes to work on freeing your loved ones. When you engage our services a closely knit team immediately springs into action assisting you to navigate the criminal justice process while quickly and efficiently bailing your loved one.

We even have a detailed network of professional attorney's, mostly former prosecutors, located in each county that can be referred to you upon request.

We offer a free bail consultation and with Affordable, you can be confident that we will always be here for you, your family and friends as our offices are designed to privately and discreetly handle your personal bail transactions in a clean and comfortable suite setting, unlike the 'check cashing place/bullet proof glass' appearance of conventional Bail Bondsman.

Simply, in time of crisis selecting the appropriate bail bondsman is a crucial decision that needs to be made if a friend or loved one is to be bailed out quickly.  Rule of thumb for bail is 10% commission.

By selecting Affordable Bails New York, Inc. you have made the appropriate decision insuring that a loved one gets the opportunity to be free during criminal proceedings against him/her.   Many different choices and bail bondsmen exist, but only a few will help in navigating the complicated criminal justice process successfully.

Affordable Bails New York, Inc. and its personnel have designed this website in order to help you understand the bail process. 

We attempt to address every question while managing your expectations when posting bail using Affordable Bails New York, Inc.  You can be confident that you are doing all that can be done to help your friend or loved one get out of jail as quickly as possible.

Bail bond laws vary from state to state, but understanding the basic rules regarding posting a bail bond will help you make a more informed decision when time is a factor.

We realize that being arrested is a stressful and frightening experience not only for the defendant but for the family as well.  With Affordable you can be assured that the process of bailing out a friend or loved one will be handled courteously and executed expeditiously.

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Corporate Headquarters located Affordable Bails New York Inc. Corporate Headquarters Located 320 Carlton Avenue Suite #1000 Central Islip, NY 11722 Tel: 631 234-2663